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Abstract 
Whether all parties to the employment relationship benefit from workplace partnership and with 
what consequences is one of the most persistent research questions in industrial relations scholarship. 
Three dominant theoretical frameworks are identified. They are the mutual gains, pessimistic and 
constrained mutuality perspectives. Using both quantitative and qualitative case study data, the paper 
queries the prevailing view that it is possible to categorise partnership outcomes as fitting neatly into 
one of these three theoretical perspectives. The paper investigates the critical role of employees’ 
perception of the distribution of partnership gains for their orientation to their employer and union, 
and in regard to their support for a continuation of a partnership approach. 
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1. Introduction  
In spite of the rich international literature on workplace partnership, there remains considerable 
debate as to who actually benefits from its adoption, and in what measure. Three broad scholarly 
perspectives have addressed this issue.  The first, the so-called ‘mutual gains’ thesis, argues that all 
parties have the potential to benefit, perhaps even equally in favourable conditions (Cooke 1990; 
Kochan and Osterman 1994). The second, which we term the ‘pessimistic thesis’, claims that 
workers and trade unions do not, and are very unlikely to derive any gains (Godard 2004; Kelly 
2004). The final perspective, the ‘constrained mutuality’ thesis, suggests that while employees may 
benefit, the balance of advantage in practice tends to be skewed towards the employer (Guest and 
Peccei 2001). The assumption with each of these perspectives is that it is possible to come to one 
‘settled’ view as to who gains (and loses) from partnership. 
 
In this paper, we challenge that central assumption. We argue that these three perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive when considered from the perspective of stakeholders, and that if the analysis is 
fine-grained enough to include both objective data and employee perspectives, then it is possible that 
the gains from partnership can be consistent with more than one of the theoretical perspectives. We 
demonstrate the argument through a detailed critical case study of a unique partnership, one that 
possessed many of the necessary preconditions for the creation and sharing of mutual gains identified 
in the literature.  
 
Our approach differs from prior research in several ways. First, in measuring partnership gains, we 
draw a distinction between ‘bottom-line’ indicators (i.e. performance levels, wages and conditions of 
employment, levels of union influence, etc.) and employees’ perceptions of partnership gains and of 
their assessment of the manner in which they are distributed between management, employees and 
the union. In taking account of both measures, we believe, as Bélanger and Edwards (2007: 715) 
observe in their analysis of workplace compromise, that it is necessary to go beyond the notion of 
what constitutes a party’s a priori ‘interests’ and to include a subjective assessment of what is a 
‘gain’, what is not; and in the context of the present paper, how any gains are perceived to be shared. 
Second, we look for variations amongst employee perceptions, distinguishing between three 
categories of employees, senior and junior managers and non managerial employees, using both 
surveys and interviews.  Finally, we examine the consequences of employees’ perceptions of the 
effects of partnership for their orientations to the company, the trade union and to a continuation of a 
 3 
partnership approach. This is an analysis that is necessary but rare in studies of partnership. 
 
2. Literature review  
In our review of the literature, we consider the following questions: who gains from partnership, how 
might the distribution of gains be accounted for, and what are the consequences of a skewed or 
shared distribution of the gains. We define workplace partnership as an approach to organisational 
governance and change which is designed explicitly to permit union representatives participate in 
organisational decision-making and which exists separate from collective bargaining arrangements.  
 
The ‘mutual gains thesis’, as derived from Cooke (1990), is based on a rational choice theoretical 
approach whereby partnership is seen to increase the total ‘pie’ available to be distributed between 
management and employees than that which might otherwise be gained from the pursuit of an 
adversarial model. The circumstances under which gains might accrue to all stakeholders are seen to 
be specific and exacting. They include the establishment of partnership principles and practices at 
multiple levels within the organisation: at the ‘strategic level’ priority is accorded to business 
strategies which emphasize innovation and quality over cost based strategies; at the ‘functional 
human resource policy level’ employment stabilisation practices are called for as well as variable 
payment systems; and at the workplace level, teamworking, employee involvement and the creation 
of a trustful and co-operative workplace climate are thought important (Kochan and Osterman 1994). 
The commitment of top management and trade union leaders is considered also to be a necessary 
prerequisite (Eaton and Rubinstein 2006: 12) as is a high degree of trust between both parties (Guest 
and Peccei 2001; Oxenbridge and Brown 2002). The presence of different forms of employee 
participation, including direct and indirect, operating in tandem and in alignment at all or various 
levels within the organisation is also seen as being more likely to lead to positive outcomes for all 
parties. Outside the firm, a thriving economy and the presence of national social pacts are considered 
important. The former allows companies to expand, grow their profits and, in turn, to share the gains 
with employees (Oxenbridge and Brown 2002). The latter provides guidance and legitimacy for the 
exploration of workplace partnership arrangements (Roche 2007).  
 
The mutual gains perspective attaches particular importance to measuring both extrinsic (‘bottom-
line’) and intrinsic costs and benefits (see Cooke 1990: 35-40). Cooke emphasises the manner in 
which intrinsic benefits (improved communications, better relations between line management and 
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employees) may lead to ‘bottom-line’ gains such as fewer grievances, improved job security, or 
increased productivity. Kochan (2000), too, argues that partnership creates an opportunity for 
positive attitudinal changes amongst employees. Indeed Kochan’s starting point is that employees 
have grown disaffected with adversarial industrial relations. By seeking to champion cooperative 
modes of representation, unions are seen to benefit by maintaining the loyalty and engagement of 
their membership which, in turn, enhances their representative capacity.  
 
Cooke’s (1990) research found that all parties achieved gains. Employees’ commitment to unions 
increased and unions were identified as having enhanced their capacity to resolve members’ 
problems. Employees gained in respect of increased job satisfaction, while employers benefited from 
a modest increase in organisations’ financial performance and in an improvement in relations 
between managers and employees; employees’ organisational commitment also increased. While 
there may be some doubts as to the reliability of the effects identified by Cooke – his sample of 
organisations was small (58 firms), and although he makes theoretical claims as to the consequences 
of partnership for managers, unions and employees, his empirical test is confined solely to data 
derived from management and union leaders – more recent in-depth case studies of advanced forms 
of partnership at Saturn and Kaiser Permanente in the US provide evidence that mutual gains are 
possible (Kochan et al. 2008; Rubinstein and Kochan 2001). 
 
The ‘pessimistic thesis’ argues that workers and trade unions do not and are very unlikely to benefit 
from partnership. In an early critique, Kelly (1999) claimed unions were required to adopt a posture 
of ‘moderation’, to cede to employer demands, and employers were identified as failing to honour 
partnership agreements. In a later review study of 22 matched pairs of partnership and non-
partnership companies, Kelly’s (2004) found that managers gained most from partnership. Although 
there was some evidence of employee gains, this was only in cases where unions were strong and 
where the firm was performing well. The results in terms of employment security, wage levels and 
influence in the company were found not to be favourable to employees and their unions (Kelly 
2004: 281-3).   
 
Other research, too, points to unions and employees being disadvantaged by partnership (e.g., 
Richardson et al. 2004; Upchurch et al. 2008). In financial services, Gall (2008: 152) found that 
partnership weakened unions and workers’ influence over the terms of employment, and that there 
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was “no evidence of a deep-seated and permanent endorsement of partnership in attitude (amongst 
members).” 
 
The ‘constrained mutuality thesis’ challenges the optimism of the mutual gains perspective as well as 
the pessimism of the pessimistic perspective.  It draws mainly from empirical research and argues 
that, while workers and unions stand to benefit from partnership, the gains, in general, accumulate in 
employers’ favour.  Guest and Peccei’s (2001) study of 54 partnership companies in the UK found 
that employers were primarily concerned with increasing employees’ responsibilities and 
productivity and were less concerned with employees’ welfare or rights to participate in workplace 
decision-making. In examining employees’ views of the distribution of gains from partnership in 
Ireland, Roche (2009: 26) concluded that there was no “major asymmetry with respect to the balance 
of mutuality or advantage in partnership.” 
 
Both Roche’s and Guest and Peecei’s research are revealing as to the manner in which partnership 
and associated HR practices influence organisational, employee and trade union outcomes. Both 
studies’ results are interpreted as confirming, in large part, the absence of a direct association. In 
Roche’s study, perceptions of union effectiveness and union commitment were influenced by a 
number of outcomes associated with partnership, such as, information provision and job satisfaction. 
In Guest and Peccei’s (2001: 231) research it is only when employees are engaged in terms of 
attitudes and behaviours that performance gains become apparent. The authors interpret the nature of 
these linkages as confirming that “positive organizational outcomes of interest to employers depend 
for their achievement upon the prior achievement of outcomes likely to be relevant to employees and 
their representatives.” 
 
Guest and Peccei are clear on the implications of a skewed distribution of gains. They counsel that 
where the balance of advantage tilts too much in favour of employers, the desired-for changes in 
employee attitudes and behaviours are unlikely to materialise and, as a consequence, employers will 
forgo any potential beneficial performance outcomes. However, Osterman’s (1999) research in the 
US queries this position. Notwithstanding that Osterman is concerned with the more general 
implications of ‘high performance work systems’, he argues, in a context where employees are fully 
aware that the balance of power in the labour market rests increasingly with employers, they have 
come to accept practices and outcomes which skew the balance of advantage further in favour of 
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their employers. It may thus be conceivable that, pace Guest and Peccei, employers may benefit from 
increased performance levels from their employees even where the balance of advantage from 
partnership is skewed towards the company. 
 
In summary, we make this final observation. The assumption in much of the literature is that it is 
possible to come to a ‘settled’ view on who gains from partnership. Some studies report that all 
stakeholders gain, while others find that there are few gains for employees and unions, and yet others 
find that the balance of mutuality is in employers’ favour. Most, but not all studies give emphasis to 
‘bottom-line’ outcomes over subjective measures. In those instances where subjective indicators are 
taken account of, it is usually with the purpose of assessing their effects on organizational and union 
outcomes, so that ultimately the gains from partnership might be objectively measured and a verdict 
reached as to whether the final findings are in line with one or other of the three scholarly 
perspectives. But in large part, as Cooke (1990) has observed, the literature is silent with regard to 
how the parties might weigh up the balance of advantage between ‘bottom-line’ and intrinsic costs 
and benefits and, in turn, how any such assessment might vary between and within management, 
employees and union representatives. While there may be some measurement difficulties here, it is 
essentially a valuation problem: how do stakeholders compare and place value on different estimates 
of costs and benefits? If such questions are addressed, it opens the possibility that different parties 
may place different emphasis on different outcomes measures, which might then make it difficult to 
assess unequivocally which of the three scholarly perspectives provides the greatest theoretical 
purchase in explaining partnership outcomes. 
 
3. Research design and approach 
This paper draws on a case study of a large financial services company with workplaces located 
throughout Ireland. The company was highly profitable and had prospered greatly from the 
exponential growth of the Irish economy through the 1990s and early-mid 2000s. It had a large and 
well-resourced employee relations function. Its senior managers were well-versed in the academic 
and consultancy literature on employee and union participation in organisational decision-making. A 
large majority of the company’s employees, up to and including significant sections of senior 
management, were represented by the Irish Bank Officials’ Association (IBOA), the largest and most 
influential union in Ireland’s financial services industry.  
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In 2006, access was permitted to company management, workplace management, employees and 
union representatives, as well as to all relevant documentation and records. Access to professional 
union representatives was negotiated separately and here, too, complete access was granted. 
Intensive interviews were conducted with a variety of senior management personnel and union 
representatives in late 2006 and early 2007. This included four interviews with management with 
responsibility for industrial relations and HRM at company level, two regional HR managers, three 
workplace managers, two senior IBOA officials as well as two shop stewards. All had been involved 
at various stages in the design and implementation of partnership. One IBOA official and one senior 
manager had been centrally involved at all stages of the development, review and operation of 
partnership. 
 
A postal survey of the company’s retail staff was conducted in July 2007. In line with Guest and 
Peccei’s (2001: 233) recommendation, the attitudes and behaviours of a range of managers and 
employees were examined. A proportionate probability stratified sampling procedure was used to 
survey the attitudes and views of 851 employees of whom 66 were categorised as senior managers, 
213 as junior managers and the remaining 572 were non-managerial employees. Of those employees 
selected for interview, 462 responded to the request to complete the questionnaire, giving a total 
response rate of 54 per cent. The response rate varied across the three occupational groups: 79 per 
cent for senior management, 64 per cent for junior management and 48 per cent for non-managerial 
employees. To adjust for these differences in response rates, the response sample was weighted to 
restore the number of respondents to their correct respective proportions in the workforce. The 
weighted response sample is 670. 
 
Finally, nine retail outlets were selected for close study to represent a broad representation of 
geographical spread and size. A third was located in large urban areas, another third in large 
provincial towns and the final third in medium-sized rural towns. Two of the outlets had 50 to 100 
employees, five had 25 to 49 employees and the remaining two had fewer than 24 employees. In 
each outlet, the manager or assistant manager was interviewed along with the workplace union 
representative. At least one junior manager, one experienced employee and one recently recruited 
employee were interviewed. In all, 45 in-depth interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted 
between 35 and 45 minutes and was conducted by following a series of questions detailed in an aide-
memoire. The authors also prepared a preliminary research report which was delivered in separate 
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presentations to management and senior union officials. Feedback was provided which in turn added 
to the data analysis. 
 
4. The Context of Partnership in FinanceCo 
In the 1970s and the 1980s industrial relations in the Irish financial services industry were at best 
‘arm’s-length’ and, at worst, adversarial.1 Negotiations took place at a sectoral level. Relations 
worsened in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s with disputes over the introduction of new 
technologies, initiatives by management to reduce costs, and management employees opting out of 
union representation in favour of individual contracts of employment. Matters came to a head in 
1992 when the IBOA entered into dispute with the main employers in pursuit of a pay claim on foot 
of past productivity gains and in regard to disagreement of the terms of proposed extended opening 
hours. Individual companies responded by reducing employees’ salaries and suspending staff. The 
IBOA escalated their industrial action to a full-scale national strike but, as it did, relations within the 
union became embittered as some members, particularly at management and senior employee grades, 
broke IBOA directives, passed pickets and continued to work. The dispute was resolved some four 
months later under the auspices of the Labour Court. In its aftermath, it was widely believed that the 
companies’ position had been strengthened (for the first time in the face of a national strike 
workplaces had remained open) and the IBOA had been weakened, but that the union remained a 
considerable force. Relations between the IBOA and FinanceCo remained embittered and tense for 
some considerable time after the strike. 
 
Following a lengthy review of its employment relations strategy in the mid to late 1990s, FinanceCo 
decided to recast its relationship with the IBOA and develop a co-operative relationship. A small 
working group made up of senior representatives from the company and the union was formed to 
find a way forward. At the outset, the parties considered it imprudent to adopt the term partnership or 
to seek publicity for any such initiative against the recent proximity of a bitter dispute. As time 
moved on and as their efforts took shape, the architects and supporters of partnership took 
encouragement from the national social partners’ commitment to support workplace partnership as a 
mode of workplace governance.2 When the partnership was formally launched in the early 2000s, 
both parties acknowledged that the principles identified within the framework agreement had been 
helpful in their efforts in developing a partnership approach. 
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The buoyant economic circumstances of the national economy and the financial outlook for the 
company were also thought to be propitious, affording the parties the space and relative calm to 
develop the contours of a new model of employment relations.  
 
Management’s rationale for adopting partnership was that it would, in a context of increasing market 
competition, help them to differentiate their product offerings and quality of service from other 
firms. It was also felt that the introduction of new technologies would be aided by working closely 
with staff and the union. The union, for its part, accepted that partnership “made good business 
sense” and was likely to improve the organisation’s financial performance, but was firmly of the 
view that any such success would be shared with staff.  
 
In initiating the partnership, management and union representatives agreed not to sign ‘an 
agreement’ but instead placed emphasis on a conception of partnership and set of principles to guide 
their relations. Both parties pledged to work together to ensure the future success of the organisation. 
To support the role of the IBOA in strategic decision-making, the union received guarantees of 
institutional security; employees were assured of good, secure employment; new grievance handling 
mechanisms would be developed; and financial participation was espoused. While the early 
emphasis was on developing relationships at a central level and giving focus to the importance of 
consultation and joint decision-making in respect of major change initiatives, it was agreed that 
partnership would accord local union representatives a say in jointly resolving employee relations 
issues at workplace level. A forum at workplace level was also established where employees could 
discuss matters of concern amongst themselves without the presence of a manager. They were then 
encouraged to bring any issues to the attention of management where they felt this was warranted. 
The ‘agreement’ thus envisaged partnership being multi-level and multi-stranded.  
 
A new approach to handling workplace change with successive steps was also introduced. In the first 
stage, negotiations were to follow a problem-solving approach with extensive sharing of information. 
Where there was a failure to reach an agreement, the issue would be brought before a facilitator. If 
conciliation failed, the final stage of the process permitted the facilitator to make a final 
determination.  
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In the mid 2000s, management and union representatives decided to revitalise and extend the 
partnership. To distinguish this new phase from the initial phase, the terms ‘first- and ‘second-
generation’ partnerships’ were adopted. The intention was to forge a ‘closer integration of business 
priorities and staff needs’, develop local level partnership and establish an enhanced joint 
communications strategy. Consideration was also given to the development of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. The practice of addressing conflict in established adversarial settings was 
deemed to have embittered relations in the past and risked contaminating otherwise good relations 
that were seen to be developing under partnership.  
 
The most significant initiative introduced under the aegis of partnership was a new employee 
appraisal scheme (EAS). The EAS was designed to integrate the management of employees’ 
performance, reward and careers below the rank of senior manager. It involved the introduction of a 
new performance management system (including performance related pay) and a re-definition of 
employees’ job roles and responsibilities. The IBOA insisted that employee participation in the EAS 
would be voluntary. The union also saw the EAS as a means by which they could enhance staff pay. 
The final agreement provided for: a 2.5 per cent pensionable increase across the board in staff 
salaries; a 15 per cent increase in the salary scales of junior staff; a salary scale increase of up to 7.5 
per cent for managerial grades up to assistant manager; and the introduction of a new voluntary 
performance related pay system, with bonus payments ranging from 3.7 per cent to 7.2 per cent. 
 
In summary, partnership at FinanceCo was born of a bitter industrial dispute. It took its shape from 
extensive joint deliberations; developed in a favourable, albeit increasingly competitive, commercial 
environment; and was consonant with national social partners’ efforts to develop new collaborative 
industrial relations practices. It is a case of a multi-level model of partnership wherein provision for 
union and employee involvement in decision-making and dispute resolution was developed at 
company, regional and workplace level.  
 
5. Partnership outcomes and the distribution of gains 
In order to address the question of who gained from partnership and in what measure, we focus first 
on ‘bottom-line’ gains. Second, we examine employees’ perceptions of the gains and how they were 
perceived to be distributed between the parties.  
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In interviews with senior management and union representatives, interviewees often distinguished 
between the benefits derived from the first and second-generation partnerships. With respect to the 
former, interviewees highlighted improvements staff-management relations, improvements in health 
and safety, and the resolution of individual grievances at a local level. However, partnership was 
widely seen as having been ‘top-heavy’ with little evidence of it having taken root at workplace level 
or having involved large numbers of employees. The IBOA, in particular, encountered charges that 
partnership was the preserve of an elite group. At regional level, while there was increased contact 
between union representatives and management, there was little evidence of consultation in respect 
of ‘strategic issues’. There was also confusion in respect of the remit of partnership and the manner 
in which partnership was to function in relation to other consultation fora.  
 
With respect to the second-generation agreement, management pointed to a greater number of 
‘bottom-line’ gains: partnership had become well established at the peak of the organisation and was 
used to handle the introduction of a number of initiatives, the most significant of which was the EAS; 
employees’ performance and outputs improved (this was attributed principally to the adoption of 
bonus payments and to an extension in service hours which were introduced under the aegis of 
partnership); employee retention improved, particularly of good employees occupying key positions; 
and there was greater employee flexibility.  
  
Union leaders gave emphasis to the opportunity partnership afforded them to influence management 
decision-making, as well as to improvements in employees’ terms and conditions of employment. 
With respect to the former union representatives specifically highlighted that the EAS was 
introduced after extensive consultations and a workforce ballot. The latter included increases in pay, 
the introduction of a 35-hour working week, the introduction of family-friendly policies, no 
compulsory redundancies and a commitment not to close rural service outlets, at least for a three year 
period. Union membership also recovered to the level recorded prior to the 1992 strike.  
 
An improvement in the climate of industrial relations was cited by both parties as a mutual gain. For 
management this was evidenced by employee and union acceptance of organisational and 
technological changes and the absence of any strike or work stoppage. This was perhaps the most 
significant and most often cited benefit for workplace management: “We didn’t have a single day of 
stoppage or embargo on any new product or service” (interview, April 2006). “The amount of 
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change introduced in recent years would have never been accomplished under adversarial relations. 
Every day, I know I will open” (interview, March 2008). Both parties also agreed that the new 
grievance procedure and the alternative dispute resolution system had led to fewer problems being 
escalated to company-level or being referred to external third parties. 
 
Notwithstanding these gains, management and union leaders conceded that the reach of partnership 
was uneven across the company’s workplaces. In turn, employees’ awareness of partnership and its 
achievements was seen to vary a great deal. One union representative bemoaned that partnership was 
often identified by employees as an initiative which appeared divorced from employees’ daily work 
routines (IBOA official, January 2006). Management highlighted the “enormous resources” in terms 
of staff and time consumed by partnership. But yet they feared, as indeed did union officials, that 
some managers had little understanding or sympathy for partnership and were lukewarm in their 
support, primarily as it was perceived to diminish their ability to make decisions quickly. 
 
Thus substantial gains accrued to all three stakeholders from partnership and they did so broadly in a 
manner consistent with the mutual gains thesis. In the next stage of our study we examine whether 
employees’ perceptions of the outcomes of partnership substantiate these first findings. In our 
survey, we began by looking at employees’ awareness of the presence of partnership arrangements. 
The findings confirm the observations of management and union officials. While 81 per cent of 
senior management indicated that they were familiar with of partnership, 38 per cent of junior 
managers and 63 per cent of non-managerial employees said they were not familiar. Attendance at 
meetings where employees were informed of partnership also varied considerably: 75 per cent of 
senior managers, 50 per cent of junior managers and 33 per cent of non-managerial employees 
indicated that they had attended such meetings. Young employees, particularly those employed after 
the launch of the second-generation partnership, had the lowest levels of awareness.  
 
Perceived outcomes for FinanceCo. Drawing from the results of the employee survey, we turn first 
to examine how the company was perceived to have gained from partnership. The data indicate that 
employees demonstrated moderately high levels of commitment to the company (Appendix Table 
A1): large numbers reported they were proud to be working for FinanceCo, that they saw themselves 
as being loyal employees and that they were willing to work harder to help the company succeed. On 
other items, employees were more circumspect and expressed less commitment. The majority of 
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employees considered relations between workplace management and staff to be good or very good 
(Table 1a). Employees’ trust and regard for line management was also high (Table 1b). On balance, 
then, these findings would confirm the view derived from in-depth interviews with senior 
management and union officers that the climate of employment relations in FinanceCo was good 
and, as they claimed, had improved as a consequence of partnership. 
 
Table 1a and 1b here 
 
We turn now to examine further whether these and other outcomes were attributable, in the view of 
survey respondents, to partnership. Nearly all the items examined were seen by a majority of 
respondents to have improved in the three years preceding our survey: employees reported that 
management had become more at ease with working with the union, employees had come to accept 
management decisions more readily, and employees were willing to work harder and were more 
prepared to help colleagues (Table 2). These represent significant gains for the organisation. The 
notable exception was employees’ trust in senior management. In the literature, this is one of the 
most often cited gains from partnership, but in FinanceCo this was not the case. It seems clear, 
however, that employees had a high regard for their immediate managers, trusted them and that 
relations at this level were perceived to have improved in recent years.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The results indicate that many respondents perceived partnership as having been a factor in bringing 
about these gains for the company, in particular, in regard to improving management union relations 
as well as management employee relations, in helping staff accept work decisions, and in improving 
the quality of customer service. We found that non-managerial employees and junior management 
were more likely to attribute positive effects to partnership than were senior management. 
 
In the in-depth interviews conducted at workplace level we explored further how partnership might 
have had an effect on the outcomes reported above. In general, the same influences were cited, but, 
in particular, the EAS was seen to have had a direct and substantial influence. For management the 
principal benefits were that it had led to an increase in employees’ performance as many strived to 
work harder to gain bonus payments, it helped address the behaviours of ‘poor performers’, and it 
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helped in the retention of good employees. Most considered it to have been fair and financially 
beneficial: “There are only upsides to it, especially for younger staff” (outlet manager, March 2008). 
“My salary increased by €3,360 in 2006”; “it gives people a chance to perform and progress in their 
career” (interviews with junior managers, May 2008). “It is a fair reflection of how people perform. 
It is an incentive for young people to work harder, to put themselves in front”; it “helps (us) to focus 
on the bottom-line”; “after tax it was worth me about €1,500. It’s alright; it’s not brilliant, but up to 
now there was nothing” (interviews with non-managerial employees, April 2008).  
 
Perceived outcomes for employees. Employees reported high levels of satisfaction with their jobs: 
two-thirds were happy with their pay, over 70 per cent were happy with their working conditions, 78 
per cent found their work interesting, 80 per cent had received training in the last three years and 
over 70 per cent believed that the new skills they had acquired–and which had been paid for by 
FinanceCo–would help them in getting a job with another employer. Many believed they had been 
given a greater say over decisions which affected their work.  
 
Many employees held that these and other changes in their work could be attributed to partnership 
(Table 3), in particular: involvement in decision-making, sense of job security and job satisfaction. 
We were particularly interested to look at employees’ perception of their effort levels as this has 
been a key focus of critics of partnership. The vast bulk of employees–in all categories–recorded that 
the pressure under which they worked had increased and up to two thirds believed partnership had 
been an influence. In our in-depth interviews at workplace level a variety of influences were 
emphasised. Senior and junior managers pointed to the responsibilities they were under and the long 
hours they were required to work. In the employee survey, 71 per cent and 37 per cent of senior and 
junior managers respectively reported that they worked more than 41 hours per week. Non-
managerial employees pointed to a shortage of staff at outlet level which placed a considerable strain 
on employees. Prior to the introduction of partnership, it was claimed, an outlet might not have 
opened if the full complement of staff was not at work. There was also pressure on staff to sell new 
financial products and to reach predefined targets. The EAS was a key influence in that it was seen to 
have led to a new aggressiveness in attempts to grow the business which in turn had led to 
competition and conflict amongst work colleagues. Interviewees spoke of the new ‘cut throat 
environment’, which had intensified as the wider economic climate deteriorated rendering it more 
difficult to meet targets. In sum, the pressures on employees were considerable and were seen to 
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have grown under partnership. While this finding adds weight to the pessimistic perspective, it 
should also be set alongside the finding that many employees were more willing to expend more 
effort in their work (Table 2) and to help out their colleagues (Table 3). Thus, while employees 
experienced intensification in effort and pressure levels as a consequence of changes introduced 
under partnership, many were willing to work hard out of a sense of personal responsibility to their 
work and a commitment to working with others. 
 
Finally, in a few workplaces, employees were upset that they had been, as they saw it, pressurised by 
their regional managers to join the EAS. Union members, both in managerial and non-managerial 
positions, argued that the union and partnership had failed to address these concerns adequately. 
Critics claimed that while partnership was designed to address workplace problems, the mechanisms 
for alerting and informing union officials were ill-defined and inadequate. As a result, they often 
remained ignorant of workers’ concerns.  
Table 3 here. 
 
Perceived outcomes for the union. At the outset, it is important to reiterate that, at 72%, union 
density was high in FinanceCo and that there had been no decline in recent years. Forty-four per cent 
of senior managers had also retained their union membership.  
 
First, we measured union commitment amongst union members. The overall results reveal 
moderately high levels of union commitment (Appendix Table A2). When compared with the 
findings of Geary’s (2008) study of union commitment in companies with partnership arrangements 
throughout Ireland, union members in FinanceCo were relatively well disposed towards the IBOA. 
 
In attempting to assess the direct effects of partnership on unions we first asked union members ‘how 
good has the IBOA been in representing your interests over the last three years?’ The stated time 
period was designed to capture the period since the signing of the second-generation partnership 
agreement and the introduction of the EAS. While a small minority believed the union had either 
been ‘very bad’ or ‘fairly bad’ (13%), the majority (55%) saw the union as either being ‘fairly good’ 
or ‘very good’.  
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The results in respect of union members’ views of union efficacy, orientation to membership and 
union cohesiveness also lean in a positive direction suggesting that the union had performed 
reasonably well under partnership (Table 4). A little over half of respondents said that the union was 
doing a better job at representing workers’ interests and partnership was seen by nearly all 
employees as either having had a great deal or some influence in this regard. A little over 40 per cent 
agreed that being a union member had become more important to them and here again partnership 
was seen to have been an important influence. Proponents of the pessimistic perspective often argue 
that partnership leads to internal strife and conflicts within unions. This would not seem to have 
occurred in FinanceCo. Only 13 per cent believed that tensions and conflicts within the IBOA had 
increased. The absence of internal strife was also confirmed in interviews with senior union officers 
and activists at workplace level. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
While these data might be said to confirm that the IBOA had achieved some gains under partnership, 
they do not provide a ringing endorsement. There remains some doubt in that substantial proportions 
believed the union was not doing a better job (44%) or that union membership had not become more 
important for members (58%). Given these generally positive but mixed results we explored in our 
workplace interviews why this might have been the case. We found that while employees were 
generally positive, there was a considerable spread of opinion. Most managers (senior and junior) 
believed that partnership had provided the IBOA with more power and greater input into the process 
of decision-making. In contrast, other interviewees believed the union, as well as members’ role in 
the union, had been weakened by partnership. This view was openly stated by an outlet manager who 
remained a union member:  
The IBOA’s role has now been diminished; they are in cahoots with the company. The upshot of this is 
that our input into the IBOA is less looked for. Their power source is now derived from management. I 
don’t feel I have a role in the IBOA anymore…Once the IBOA agree to something in partnership 
there’s no chance for us to influence it. (Interview, March 2008) 
 
Similarly, a junior manager reported that “partnership has diluted the performance of the IBOA who 
are now seen as a part of the company and are there to help implement decisions” (interview, May 
2008). Many non-managerial employees conceded that they did not know a great deal about 
partnership (although they were very familiar with the EAS) and were reluctant to state 
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unequivocally whether partnership had or had not been of benefit to the IBOA; they could point to 
benefits, like those listed in Table 4, but they could also point to disadvantages.  
 
Overall, while we found a mixture of views, the predominant view was that the IBOA had been an 
effective union; it had increased its influence over the company under partnership, and for many 
union members had increased in importance. But there were also reservations and doubts about the 
union’s role. In sum, though, positive and non-committal views outweighed negative attitudes. 
 
Which party was perceived to have gained most from partnership? There is a clear pattern to the 
results from our employee survey (Table 5a). Very few respondents believed that employees were 
the only or principal party to have gained. Thereafter respondents were divided in their views: half 
believed the gains were equally distributed, while the other half indicated that the company was the 
main beneficiary. There were some notable differences in the views expressed by the three different 
employee groups. Senior management were more likely to assert that the gains were equally shared 
(63%), while 31 per cent believed the company had benefited most. Junior managers were evenly 
divided. Non-managerial employees were more inclined to the view that the company was the 
primary beneficiary, although 42 per cent believed that the gains were equally distributed. 
 
Table 5a and 5b here 
 
As the EAS was the most significant initiative introduced under partnership, we enquired about the 
distribution of gains from its introduction (Table 5b). The vast bulk of respondents (92%) believed 
the EAS had benefited the company. Similarly, a large majority of employees (77%) agreed it had 
been beneficial for employees, although non-managerial workers were somewhat less certain in their 
views. Thus, it might said that in comparison to the perceived distribution of gains from partnership, 
where there was a general view that the benefits were skewed in the company’s favour, there was a 
clear perception that both the company and employees had gained from the EAS. 
 
Which theoretical perspective best explains the distribution of gains from partnership at FinanceCo? 
Having addressed the question of who gains from partnership, and in what relative proportion, we 
consider now which of the three scholarly perspectives is best supported by the evidence presented. 
From the basis of the ‘bottom-line’ evidence a reasonable case might be made that all parties 
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benefited; each stakeholder was able to point to significant gains. So, too, with the attitudinal data; 
there were evident advantages identified by respondents in all three occupational cohorts. On the 
basis of these findings this case study might reasonably be cast in defence of the theoretical claims of 
the mutual gains perspective. But there is also evidence which points in another direction: many 
respondents both in the in-depth interviews at workplace level and in the employee survey believed 
the gains from partnership amassed in the company’s favour. There were also significant 
disadvantages for employees, principally in the form of a more intensive workplace regime. Thus, it 
might also be fairly claimed that the constrained mutuality thesis or the pessimistic perspective better 
represents what occurred in FinanceCo.  
 
But which of these interpretations is most compelling? It might be answered that they are all correct. 
There is no intended ambiguity in this claim. Our analysis of employees’ views shows that 
employees were mixed in their views. In weighing up the balance of advantage, employees pointed 
to both benefits and costs, and assessments of overall outcomes varied between and within the 
different stakeholders. As such, the findings do not support one pre-defined partnership perspective. 
When viewed from the perspective of the various stakeholders the three theoretical perspectives are 
not seen as mutually exclusive. The case of FinanceCo is found to be more complex; the data defies 
a neat adherence to any of the three ‘clean’ theoretical perspectives and, as such, resists 
pigeonholing. We will return to the significance of this finding below. 
 
How then might we account for variations in employees’ perceptions of partnership outcomes? 
While the literature offers some clues, it is, as stated earlier, largely mute in examining this specific 
issue. We examine whether employees identified particular factors as being critical. One influence 
was prominent: that was the quality of line management. In interviews with senior management and 
union officials, and particularly with employees at workplace level, the influence of line 
management was expressed in various ways: “There was less trust in FinanceCo before the strike. 
There is more trust now. Employees are more likely to discuss issues with management now as they 
expect to be treated fairly due to the existence of partnership” (Regional HR manager, March 2006). 
“Partnership has filtered down to the workplace, but if the local manager is not committed, it does 
not work” (non-managerial employee, April 2008). “A lot depends on your local manager…. There 
is a very good working atmosphere since X became our manager. Previously, 80% of staff was afraid 
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to speak to the manager” (junior manager, May 2008). “Management are more open to resolve 
issues. It’s nice to have issues solved at local level” (non-managerial employee, June 2008). 
 
The importance of relations with local management was confirmed in the employee survey results. 
Table 6 presents the results of a binary logistic regression model that examines the association 
between the perceived distribution of gains from partnership and employees’ relationship with their 
line manager. The latter is derived from the results reported in Table 1b. The model controls for a 
series of influences, including familiarity with partnership, occupational group (through the use of 
dummy variables, senior management is the reference category), union membership, gender, number 
of years employed, size of workplace and form of employment contract. For reasons of economy, not 
all results are reported here. While a number of factors are identified as having an effect – 
occupational group (consistent with the results from the bivarite analysis in Table 5a) and familiarity 
with partnership – the key influence was employees’ relationship with their line management: where 
employees reported that they had a good relationship with their immediate manager, they were more 
likely to report that the gains from partnership were equally distributed. This is a significant finding. 
It highlights that employees’ perception of the distribution of partnership gains is critically 
contingent on the quality of relations with line management.   
 
What are the consequences of employees’ perceptions of partnership for their orientations to their 
employer, union and preferred form of employment relations? Prompted by Guest and Peccei’s 
(2001) argument, we consider whether employees are more likely to be positively disposed towards 
FinanceCo in circumstances where they believe the gains from partnership are shared, or rather 
might it be, as argued by Osterman (1999), that the perception of skewed outcomes will not 
necessarily prevent employees from remaining committed to their employer. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
Model 7.1 in Table 7 presents the results of a regression model that examines the association 
between the perceived distribution of gains from partnership and respondents’ commitment to 
FinanceCo. The former variable is derived from the results reported in Table 5a. The model controls 
for those same influences included in Table 6. The results indicate that a number of factors have a 
significant negative effect on employees’ commitment, including occupational group and union 
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membership, but the single greatest influence is the perception of the manner in which the gains from 
partnership are distributed: those employees who held that the gains were skewed towards the 
company were least committed to the organisation and, by corollary, those who believed the gains 
were equally distributed were more committed to the organisation. This finding is consistent with the 
arguments of Guest and Peccei (2001) and not with those of Osterman (1999).3 Familiarity with 
partnership would also seem to be important, and is consistent with the findings from other research 
(Roche and Geary 2006). 
 
With respect to employees’ orientation to the trade union we consider whether, as suggested by the 
mutual gains perspective, partnership will lead to higher union commitment levels and an 
endorsement of partnership, or rather will it be that partnership results in a loss of confidence in 
members’ belief in their union’s ability to represent their interests, with the effect of eroding 
members’ commitment to their union and partnership, as claimed by the pessimistic thesis?   
 
The data presented in Model 7.2 would seem to indicate that the IBOA has not been damaged–but 
neither would it seem to have benefited–in terms of workers’ commitment, arising from how the 
gains from partnership were perceived to have been distributed. The result is non-significant and thus 
explains little of the variance in union commitment. The results in Table 8 indicate that there is no 
association between the manner in which the gains from partnership were perceived to have been 
distributed and employees’ stated preference for a partnership or traditional collective bargaining 
approach. Neither had familiarity with the workings of partnership any noticeable effect. The only 
influence was that of occupational group. From this it might be read that, in comparison to senior 
management, non-managerial employees are less convinced of the merits of the IBOA continuing to 
pursue a partnership approach with the company. However, lest this result be confused with a union 
membership effect, it is clear that this was not the case, as union membership was found to exert no 
appreciably effect either way. Union members were thus divided over which approach is the better 
alternative. 
Table 8 here 
 
6. Summary and conclusion  
We argue in this paper that it is possible that the results from partnership could be consistent with all 
three of the perspectives identified in the literature. Our study of partnership gains in a large Irish 
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financial services company which had developed a very advanced form of partnership reveals that all 
three “stakeholders” benefited. The company gained from a better climate of employment relations, 
increased employee flexibility, higher employee effort levels, and improved performance. 
Employees benefited from increases in pay, reductions in working hours (non-managerial 
employees), employment security, flexible working arrangements, and a greater say in workplace 
governance through their union representatives. The union gained from increased influence and 
institutional security. Its membership grew and its representative capacity improved. There were also 
disadvantages, costs and failings. For the company, partnership was an expensive and time-
consuming affair which slowed decision-making. Employees’ effort levels increased as they were 
expected to achieve demanding performance targets. Senior and junior managers worked long hours 
and were under significant strain. The union was criticised, together with management, for having 
failed to diffuse partnership across the company. However, the predominant view was that 
partnership had been of substantial benefit and that, in the round, the gains for all parties out-
weighed the costs.  
 
But which party gained most? Here we drew on employees’ perceptions. There was a striking 
variation in employees’ views both within and between the three identified occupational cohorts. 
Senior management were the most likely to record that, while there were benefits for the company, 
the gains were mostly in favour of the workforce. Junior management were evenly divided in their 
views and non-managerial employees were more inclined to the view that the benefits had been 
disproportionately acquired by the company. 
 
What then can we make of these findings – the ‘bottom-line’ evidence and actors’ perceptions – in 
combination? While there is support for the mutual gains, pessimistic and constrained mutuality 
perspectives, we argue that the outcomes from partnership are varied and complex and, as such, 
refuse to submit to any one defined theoretical perspective. The picture of partnership at FinanceCo 
is one of a variegated portrait: there is no neat set of findings which would permit us to say without 
ambiguity that the outcomes support one of the three scholarly perspectives. Given these 
complexities, we submit that much of the debate surrounding partnership has been misguided given 
that, regardless of whichever perspective might be supported using ‘bottom-line’ outcome data, 
stakeholders’ assessments span all three. Thus, our study points to the importance of including an 
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evaluation of actors’ subjective assessment and perceptions in addition to the usual bottom-line 
indicators.  
 
Our study also highlights the importance of two additional questions which have not been considered 
to date. First, what are the consequences of variation in perceptions both within and between 
stakeholders; and second, what accounts for variation in perceptions of outcomes? The answer to the 
first question gets at a core issue in studies of partnership; that is, the critical role played by 
employees’ adherence to a mutual gains, pessimistic or constrained mutuality perspective for their 
orientations to the company, union and preferred form of employment relations. Notwithstanding the 
conventional reservation regarding the interpretation of cause-and-effect relationships in cross-
sectional data, it was found that the perception that the distribution of gains was skewed towards the 
employer had clear consequences for employees’ commitment to their employer but had ambiguous 
implications for their union. The evidence is that employees had clear expectations of how 
partnership’s gains should have been shared between the various stakeholders. As anticipated by 
Guest and Peccei (2001), where the gains were perceived to be appropriated disproportionately by 
the employer, employees’ organisational commitment was undermined. On the other hand, the 
consequences for the union were less certain: the manner in which the gains from partnership were 
perceived to have been distributed had little if any discernible consequence for members’ 
commitment to the union and for their preference for continuing with a partnership approach. A 
benign reading might suggest that union members understood, and were sympathetic observers of, 
the circumstances within which their union operated: where they saw that the gains had been 
unevenly distributed, they had not grown disenchanted with their union or of its adoption of a 
partnership approach. On the other hand, it might be read that, while employees–and union 
members–were not overtly critical of partnership and of the union’s role therein, they remained 
divided and uncertain as to the union’s strategy of pursuing a partnership approach. But whichever 
reading is more fitting, it is clear that one particular group of employees – those in non-managerial 
grades – were relatively less forgiving. Where they perceived gains from partnership to have been 
disproportionately acquired by management they were clear in their preferences: they wanted the 
union to revert to a traditional bargaining relationship. 
 
Second, there is the issue of what accounts for variation in perceived outcomes. This study chose a 
case company which exhibited many of the features (strong union, top management and union 
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support, business strategies which emphasized customer service and quality, HR practices which 
included variable pay and employment security) – and was located within a wider context of support 
(buoyant economy and the existence of a national framework agreement endorsing workplace 
partnership) – thought well suited to create and sustain the distribution of mutual gains. The findings 
support the view that these conditions were important in creating a context within which partnership 
developed and led to substantially beneficial outcomes for all parties. However, it must be stressed 
that, while these conditions were favourable, they were not enough. As Bélanger and Edwards have 
commented, “it still takes an effort for co-operative relations to be generated” (2007: 720, our 
emphasis).  We find that the role of line management and the quality of relations between manager 
and employee were key determinants of variation in perceived outcomes. Where employees 
perceived their immediate manager to be trustworthy, fair and considerate of their interests and point 
of view, they were more likely to judge that the gains from partnership were fairly distributed. Thus, 
while corporate management and union leaders had a shared commitment to partnership, the role of 
line management was critical in bringing to life the values and principles of partnership. 
 
Our study prompts three questions for further research. Although our study involved the analysis of 
objective outcomes and employee perceptions, it is a study at one point in time. A longitudinal 
research design would permit an examination of how actors’ perceptions change over time, and 
could also help us understand the ways in which a sustained attempt to embed partnership is 
perceived to lead to changes in material outcomes and to changes in actors’ interpretations. A second 
and related question is how workplace partnership arrangements which developed in favourable 
contexts might withstand new challenges, particularly from changes in economic forces (such as the 
current economic shock we are experiencing). Third as indicated above, a great deal of the literature 
on partnership has highlighted a set of conditions which in combination create favourable or less 
favourable conditions for positive outcomes to arise from partnership. We have emphasised as have 
others that, even where circumstances are favourable, it still takes an effort for co-operation and 
material gains to be generated (as well as a perception of same). Our study highlighted the role of 
line management. Future research might examine how this influence and perhaps other sources of 
action might operate to shape the outcomes of partnership. 
 
 
 
 24 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to two referees and Sarosh Kuruvilla for their helpful suggestions in improving this 
paper. We thank Maeve Houlihan and Heidi Nicolaisen for their comments. We are grateful to 
FinanceCo management and employees and IBOA representatives for their participation in this 
study. 
 
Notes 
1. Gall (2008: 187) portrays employers’ strategy in Ireland’s financial services as having been close to ‘forcible 
opposition’ in contrast to the UK where employers tried to ‘incorporate’ union representatives and/or substitute staff 
associations for unions. This, Gall suggests, fostered a greater sense of unionateness amongst Irish employees than 
was evident in the UK. The IBOA can thus be seen to have entered into partnership with a more secure sense of its 
mobilisation capacity than perhaps might have unions in the UK. 
2. Partnership 2000, the national-level tripartite social partnership agreement (1997 to 2000), contained a framework 
agreement intended to foster and promote the diffusion of workplace partnership. A variety of state agencies and 
supports were developed to aid companies which wished to introduce such arrangements. 
3. Because the data are cross-sectional, however, the possibility that employees less committed to the company may 
have been critical of partnership from the outset and doubted that its gains could ever be equally shared cannot be 
ruled out; or perhaps that causation may also be reciprocal. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1 
Organisational Commitment 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
An eight-item scale, each item scored: 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. 
Items marked with an asterisk are reverse coded. 
 
                                Mean       S.D. 
 
1. My values and FinanceCo’s values are very similar 
  
 3.84  0.720   
2.  I feel very little loyalty to FinanceCo* 
 
 3.78  0.957   
3. I am proud to be working for FinanceCo  
 
 3.55  0.858   
4. 
 
 
I am willing to work harder than I have in order to help FinanceCo 
succeed 
  
3.52 
  
0.927 
  
5. Often, I find it difficult to agree with FinanceCo’s policies on important 
matters relating to its employees* 
 
  
3.09 
  
0.953 
  
6. FinanceCo really inspire the very best in me in the way of job  
performance 
  
3.03 
  
0.934 
  
 
7. 
 
I would turn down another job with more pay in order to stay with 
FinanceCo 
  
 
2.60  
  
 
1.121 
  
 
8. 
 
I would take almost any job to keep working for FinanceCo 
  
2.06 
  
0.855 
  
 
 
Cronbach Alpha = 0.79 
 
Composite Scale Mean = 25.5, S.D. = 4.7 
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TABLE A2 
Union Commitment 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
An eight item scale, each item scored 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. 
Items marked with an asterisk are reverse coded. 
 
  Mean     S.D. 
 
 
1. 
 
 
It’s every member’s duty to support or help another worker with his or 
her grievances.  
 
 
 
3.76 
 
 
 
0.801 
 
 
2. 
 
 
Every union member must be prepared to take the time and risk of 
lodging a grievance 
 
 
 
3.73 
 
 
 
0.808 
 
 
3. 
 
 
There’s a lot to be gained from joining the union 
 
 
 
3.64 
 
 
0.92 
 
4. 
 
The record of my union is a good example of what dedicated people can 
get done 
 
 
 
3.47 
  
 
0.927 
 
5. 
 
My values and the union’s values are very similar 
 
 
3.44 
 
0.828 
 
6. 
 
I feel a sense of pride at being part of the union 
 
3.41 
 
0.876 
 
 
7. 
 
 
I could work just as well in another organization where there was no 
union, as long as the type of work was similar* 
 
 
 
 
3.28 
 
 
 
1.037 
 
8. 
 
I am willing to put a great deal of effort in beyond that normally 
expected of me in order to make the union successful 
 
 
 
2.93 
 
 
0.836 
 
9. 
 
My loyalty is to my work and not to my union*  
 
 
2.89 
 
0.911 
 
10. 
 
If asked, I would serve on a committee for the union 
 
 
2.57 
 
1.065 
   
Cronbach Alpha = 0.809 
 
Composite Scale Mean = 33.1, S.D. = 5.48 
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TABLE 1a                                      
The Climate of Staff-Management Relations at Workplace Level 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Broadly speaking, how would you  
describe the relationship between staff      
and management in your workplace? 
 
Very  
good 
  % 
Good 
   % 
Neither 
good 
nor bad 
    % 
 
Bad 
 % 
Very  
Bad 
% 
N 
(un- 
weighted) 
                          Non- managerial employees 18   53 21 7 1 273 
                          Junior managers 22   68 7 3 1 137 
                          Senior managers 42   46 6 4 2   50 
                                                      Total 22   57 15 6 1 450 
 
 
TABLE 1b 
Employees’ Assessment of their Relationship with their Manager  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
        
                                                 
1 Each item scored 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Cronbach Alpha = 0.917. Composite Scale Mean = 15.2, 
S.D. = 3.16. 
      
 Strongly 
agree  
  
    %  
Agree 
 
 
  % 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
 
     % 
Disagree 
 
 
    % 
Strongly       
disagree 
 
    % 
 
Mean1 (S.D.)      N 
                  (unweighted) 
My manager treats me 
fairly                                                         
 
    19   62     12   6     1 3.96 (0.80)        459 
I trust my manager     17   55     16  10     1 3.81 (0.91)        458 
My manager makes 
every effort to see my 
point of view  
 
    14 
 
  55 
 
    18 
 
 12 
 
    1 
 
3.72 (0.91)        459 
 
My manager looks 
after me and my 
interests 
 
     
    12 
 
   
  56 
 
   
    19 
 
 
 12 
 
 
    2 
 
 
3.69 (0.91)         460 
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TABLE 2 
Outcomes of Partnership of Benefit to FinanceCo 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    
  
 
Yes 
A  
great 
deal  
% 
To some 
extent 
 
% 
Not 
at all       
 
% 
       N 
(unweighted) 
Management at FinanceCo have become 
more at ease working with the IBOA  
 
73      
 
 36 
 
60 
 
4 
 
287 
 
Relations between management and 
employees have improved 
 
 
70 
 
  
25 
 
 
64 
 
 
11 
 
 
299 
 
My trust in FinanceCo senior 
management has increased 
 
 
38 
 
  
18 
 
 
62 
 
 
20 
 
 
162 
 
I accept work decisions more readily 
 
77 
 
 16 
 
59 
 
25 
 
313 
 
I have become more committed to 
FinanceCo as my employer 
 
 
50 
 
  
22 
 
 
51 
 
 
27 
 
 
203 
 
I am now more willing to put more effort 
into my work 
 
 
62 
 
 
23 
 
 
45 
 
 
32 
 
 
247 
 
The quality of my service to FinanceCo 
customers has improved 
 
 
77 
 
 
27 
 
 
36 
 
 
37 
 
 
314 
 
If yes, to what extent can 
this change be attributed 
to partnership? 
 
Have any of the following 
changes taken place over  
the last three years (2004-2007) 
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TABLE 3 
Outcomes of Partnership of Benefit to Employees 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  
 
Yes  
   
     
 % 
 
 
 
A 
great 
deal 
% 
  
 
 
To 
some 
extent 
% 
 
 
Not 
at 
all 
% 
 
 
   
       N 
(unweighted) 
Employees have been given a greater say in   
decisions which affect their work and employment  
 
43 
 
     16 
 
    77 
    
7 
 
190 
 
I feel my job with FinanceCo has become more secure    
                           
 
52 
 
     30 
 
    56 
  
14 
 
214 
I have become more informed of the business 
circumstances of FinanceCo  
 
 
86 
  
     17 
 
    67 
 
  6 
          
355 
I feel happier in my job   
 
51      19      51 30         210 
The level of influence that I have over the conduct of 
my day-to-day work has increased  
 
 
55 
 
     15 
 
    50 
   
35 
 
228 
The pressure I work under has increased 
 
89      43     21 36 352 
I have been more willing to help out my work 
colleagues 
 
79 
      
     35 
     
    29 
     
36 
 
322 
 
If yes, to what extent can 
this change be attributed 
to partnership? 
Have any of the following 
changes taken place over 
the last 3 years (2004-2007) 
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TABLE 4 
Outcomes of Partnership of Benefit to Unions 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Have any of the following      
    changes taken place over the last     
   3 years (2004-2007) 
                  
 
  
Yes 
  
% 
A 
great 
deal 
 % 
To 
some 
Extent 
   % 
 
Not 
at 
All 
% 
N 
(unweighted) 
      
The IBOA is now doing a better job at  
representing workers’ interests in FinanceCo 
 
 
56 
 
30 
 
65 
 
5 
 
        232 
 
Being a trade union member has become more 
important for me 
 
 
42 
 
 
40 
 
 
49 
 
 
11 
 
   
        181 
 
 
Tensions and conflicts within IBOA have increased 
 
 
13 
 
 
29 
 
 
57 
 
 
14 
 
 
          42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If yes, to what extent can this 
change be attributed to 
partnership? 
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TABLE 5a 
The Distribution of Gains from Partnership 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                  
 FinanceCo  
is the only 
one to 
benefit  
 
 
 
% 
FinanceCo 
benefits 
most and 
there are  
few gains 
for 
employees 
% 
FinanceCo 
and employees 
benefit equally 
 
 
 
 
% 
 
Employees benefit 
most and there are 
few gains for 
FinanceCo.  
 
 
              
         % 
Employees 
are the only 
ones to benefit 
 
 
 
 
% 
N 
(unweighted) 
Non-
managerial 
employees  
 
 
5 
 
 
51 
 
 
42 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
259 
Junior 
managers  
 
4 
 
45 
 
49 
 
1 
 
1 
 
137 
Senior 
managers 
 
0 
 
31 
 
63 
 
6 
 
0 
 
  51 
 
 
 
  Total 
 
4 
 
47 
 
47 
 
2 
 
0 
 
447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5b 
Employee Appraisal Scheme: Perceived Outcomes 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                    % Very or quite beneficial 
 
 Non-
managerial  
employees 
Junior 
Managers  
Senior  
Managers  
 
 
Total 
(i) How beneficial has the EAS been for employees?   68 88 93   77 
     
     
(ii) How beneficial has the EAS been for 
FinanceCo? 
 89 93 92    92 
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TABLE 6 
The Distribution Gains from Partnership: Logistic Regression Results 
 
 
 
                  Beta    S.E. 
 
Familiarity with Partnership       0.319**  0.123 
 
Non- managerial employees1     -1.118***  0.336 
 
Junior Management1      -0.929***  0.273 
 
Trade union members      -0.104   0.219 
 
Relationship with line management      0.250***  0.034 
 
 
R2=0.162 (Cox and Snell), 0.216 (Nageltiert). Model X (10) = 108.80*** 
N (weighted) = 615 
 
 
 
Notes: **Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, ***at the 0.001 level. The dependent variable is the 
perceived distribution of gains from partnership recoded as an equal (‘mutual gains’) or unequal 
(‘constrained mutuality’) distribution. If the former is the case, the beta sign is positive, and is 
negative for the latter. 
 
Control variables used in the model are detailed in the text. 
 
1 The reference category is senior management. 
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TABLE 7 
Partnership, Constrained Mutuality and Employees’ Commitment to FinanceCo and the IBOA: OLS Regression 
Results 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                        7.1 Firm Commitment    7.2 Union Commitment   
            
  
 
       Adjusted R² = -0·222***       Adjusted R² = -0.086*** 
N (weighted) = 417                   N (weighted) = 331 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  *Signifies statistically significant at the 0.05 level, **at the 0.01 level, and ***at the 0.001 level. 
The dependent variable in Model 7.1 is employees’ commitment to the company and in Model 7.2 is union 
members’ commitment to the union.  
 
Control variables used in the models are detailed in the text. 
 
¹ The reference category is senior management 
 
² Model 7.2 is confined to union members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Beta   t-value             Beta      t-value 
Distribution of gains from partnership   -0·306 6.755***         -0.089    1.647 
Familiarity with partnership    0·190 3.801***          0.244     4.139*** 
Non-managerial employees¹       -0·195 2.262*              0.352     2.778* 
Junior management¹   -0·067 0.964                 0.239    2.066* 
Trade unions members   -0·123  2.613**                ̶̶             ̶ 
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TABLE 8 
Partnership, Constrained Mutuality and Employees’ Preference for Future Union Role: Logistic Regression 
Results 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                        
 
 
R²=0·043 (Cox and Snell), 0.057 (Nagelkerte). Model X² (9) = 24.94**. 
N (weighted) = 573 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether employees’ would prefer the IBOA to adopt a partnership or a 
traditional collective bargaining approach in their dealings with FinanceCo. If it is the former, the beta 
sign is negative, and positive for the latter.  
 
*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
Control variables used in the model are detailed in the text. 
 
¹ The reference category is senior management. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
    Beta    S.E. 
Distribution of gains from partnership    0.172 
 
  0.176 
Familiarity with partnership   -0.174                0.119 
Non-managerial employees¹     0.907*    0.403 
Junior management¹     0.692    0.373 
Trade unions members     0.267                     0.234 
